Although the war, which started with the attacks against Iran on February 28, 2026, entered a new phase with the ceasefire of April 8, 2026, the absence of a permanent peace agreement continues to keep the region in a legal ‘’war time’’ status. This situation does not represent a ceasefire in the classical sense, but rather an intermediate regime in which the conflict is kept under control at low intensity. For this reason, the current picture does not point to a normalization in which the Strait of Hormuz is opened to international maritime traffic in a free and predictable manner as in peacetime, but, on the contrary, to a hybrid structure in which the peacetime “transit” regime has effectively collapsed and been replaced by “selective passage” practices in which the laws of belligerent states and neutrals are intertwined. The fact that the other riparian state, Oman, did not openly object to this process, and even sought to establish a new transitional regime with Iran, indicates that the crisis has evolved into a bilateral security order.
The effects of this crisis are not only regional but also constitute a direct systemic rupture for the global economic system. The disruption in this artery, through which 20–21 million barrels of oil per day and a significant portion of global LNG trade passes, not only threatens the security of energy supply but also leads to a chain contraction in the food production, petrochemical, fertilizer, transportation, and electronics industries. The congestion caused by approximately 1,500 ships stranded in the strait is not only a physical density but also creates a multiplier effect across a wide range of areas, from insurance premiums to freight prices, from delivery times to financing costs. Especially in economies with high energy dependence and limited strategic reserve capacity, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, this situation evolves into a direct energy crisis and subsequently into social and humanitarian vulnerability. More importantly, this crisis has destroyed the assumption that “the straits are open under all circumstances” and eliminated one of the most fundamental trust assumptions of global trade. This rupture creates a permanent crisis of confidence across a wide spectrum, from investment models to strategic reserve policies of states, from energy supply chains to the insurance sector.
Power Struggle within a Legal Vacuum
The picture that emerges in Hormuz today is a typical “controlled transition” model in which the gray areas of international law are exploited. There is a deep legal paradox. While Iran refers to certain rights in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which it is not a party, the United States defends the same convention, to which it is also not a party, through “customary law.” This situation reveals a context in which international law is instrumentalized rather than functioning as a binding norm. The fact that two actors create a de facto situation on the ground by interpreting the same text in opposition to each other clearly shows that a power-based order, rather than a legal order, is decisive.
The main issue here is not the existence of transit, but under what rules, under whose control, and with what security guarantees this transit will be carried out. Historical experience clearly shows that the priority for any state under war conditions is not free passage, but the absolute protection of its own security. Germany’s occupation of Denmark during the Second World War and its control of the Danish Straits, as well as Britain’s closure of Gibraltar and Suez to the Axis powers, are clear examples of how the principle of “equal passage” was suspended under wartime conditions. These examples show that the norms of the law of the sea valid in peacetime are rapidly eroded under wartime conditions and replaced by security-based practices.
Iran’s Wartime Maritime Spatial Planning
After the April 8 ceasefire, Iran began to use the concept of “maritime spatial planning” as a strategic tool in order to transform temporary military control practices into a more permanent order. In this context, the new Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), announced during wartime, when the law of armed conflict was in force, aims to institutionalize military control rather than merely serve as a classical maritime regulation. The expansion of dangerous areas, the declaration of certain zones as “exercise areas,” and the diversion of merchant ships toward the Iranian mainland—particularly to the islands of Qeshm and Larak—have effectively turned the wartime strait into a fortified area of military control. For a state defending its homeland, wartime measures are legitimate. Within this structure, Iran determines which ship will pass through which route, at what speed it will proceed, and under what conditions it will be inspected. This situation resembles the model applied by Germany and the United Kingdom to the straits they controlled during the Second World War. If this situation continues under conditions where Iran’s security concerns are not fully addressed even after a peace agreement, maritime traffic may become increasingly unpredictable, creating serious uncertainty for international trade. Therefore, there is a need for a new peacetime regime in the region.
The Example of Montreux Convention and the Black Sea Regime
The Strait of Hormuz and the Turkish Straits, together with the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea to which they are connected, are narrow waterways that structurally possess the characteristics of semi-enclosed seas; therefore, unlimited freedom tends to produce instability rather than security. In such geographies, balance can only be achieved through controlled and regulated freedom. The Montreux Straits Convention has successfully maintained this balance for nearly a century, establishing a delicate equilibrium between the sovereignty of the riparian state and the international freedom of passage.
Turkiye’s role as a “gatekeeper” within the framework of Montreux has prevented the unlimited military buildup of foreign powers in the Black Sea. Through tonnage, type, and duration-of-stay restrictions imposed on warships, it has contributed to the preservation of regional security. This model clearly demonstrates that security can only be sustained through freedom limited by rules.
The most rational solution to the Hormuz crisis is to adapt the balance logic of Montreux to the region. This model should be built on four key elements. The first is tonnage and type restrictions. Limiting the strategic platforms of non-regional actors, especially aircraft carriers, would control military concentration in the Persian Gulf. The second is a limitation on the duration of stay. The long-term presence of foreign warships should be prevented, along with their tendency to establish de facto bases. The third is joint ownership and riparian-state priority of Iran and Oman. The fact that these two states possess a security priority similar to Turkiye would enhance the legitimacy of the regime. The fourth is the inclusion of modern threats. Going beyond the 1936 Montreux regime, UAVs, unmanned maritime vehicles, and hybrid warfare elements should also be clearly defined and regulated.
Toll Transit and War Reparations in the Hormuz Regime
In the new regime proposed for Hormuz, the gold franc-indexed service fee approach in Montreux (covering navigational aids, health services, etc.) could be expanded with a “war reparations” element to support Iran’s post-war recovery. On the other hand, the actual practices that emerged in the final two weeks before the ceasefire demonstrate that this model has already entered a phase of practical transformation. Iran’s imposition of alternative payment channels, particularly for certain tankers and commercial vessels, indicates that a new maritime transit economy is emerging—one that disrupts the classical insurance-freight-banking chain. Since Hormuz remains a legal battlefield, the toll regime extends beyond the conventional understanding of a “service fee.”
Recent field data indicate that vessels, especially those navigating close to Iranian territorial waters, are being directly or indirectly encouraged to make security-related payments. This practice is not a classical toll, but rather a de facto “security premium.” It demonstrates that Iran—and to some extent Oman—as providers of maritime security, are positioning themselves as mandatory security authorities rather than mere service providers. The most striking development in recent weeks is the increasing use of non-dollar payment channels in certain shipments. Particularly in China-linked tanker operations, there are strong indications that transactions are being settled in yuan or netted through alternative clearing mechanisms without entering the dollar system. Additionally, in high-risk or uninsured transitions, there are growing claims within the sector that agreements are being made using crypto assets. In this context, the emerging regime in Hormuz is not merely a maritime security arrangement; it also represents a payment system experiment that challenges the global financial architecture. For the first time at this scale, the absolute dominance of the dollar in maritime trade is being systematically eroded.
In this framework, Iran ceases to be merely an actor circumventing sanctions and instead becomes a constituent component of an alternative financial flow. The destruction that occurred between February 28 and April 8, 2026, caused not only military but also significant economic and infrastructural damage for Iran. In this context, an additional compensation share derived from transit is not merely a source of income, it also represents the redistribution of the cost of war to the international system. Field practices already indicate that some vessels are willing to pay higher prices for safer transit routes. This suggests that the proposed compensation mechanism is not theoretical but reflects the institutionalization of an already emerging practice.
The most critical dimension of this model is that if the combination of tolls, non-dollar payments, and compensation mechanisms can be transformed into a multilateral regime under the supervision of the United Nations, the unilateral “selective passage” system currently implemented by Iran could evolve into an internationally legitimized order. Otherwise, the existing structure may expand uncontrollably, leading to fragmented, multi-currency, and security-based transit chaos—not only in Hormuz, but also in other critical chokepoints such as Bab El-Mandeb and Malacca. Therefore, the emerging model in Hormuz is not merely a maritime regime debate. It heralds a new era in which the link between energy geopolitics and financial sovereignty is being decisively reshaped, and sea routes are no longer merely channels of trade but arenas of competition between monetary systems.
In the long term, Iran’s continuation of a model that challenges the traditional free-passage regime of international straits and monetizes transit may encounter significant international resistance. At present, global public opinion supports Iran. It has been subjected to a severe attack, is resisting for its vital interests, and has received a degree of international sympathy. However, this support is not permanent. During the Montreux negotiations in 1936, Turkiye prioritized security over economic rent, limiting passage through the Turkish Straits to symbolic service fees while retaining control over both its own security and the maritime balance in the Black Sea. However, Iran, which controls approximately one-fifth of global oil flows, may not be willing to relinquish such a scale of control to a completely free regime. It may continue to use this power as economic and strategic leverage. As long as the current regimes of Iran and the USA/Israel persist, a durable peace remains unlikely. If energy prices rise and supply disruptions intensify, actors that support Iran today may rapidly shift toward demanding free passage. In such a scenario, Iran may continue to exert pressure both in terms of revenue and negotiations by maintaining a controlled and monetized transit regime. In short, in the future, Iran may adopt a hybrid model in which both security restrictions and economic rent coexist, rather than the model in which Turkiye in 1936 prioritized security over economic gain.
The United Nations’ Role and Future Projection
In the construction of this new regime, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council should assume a shared responsibility in this area, which is critical for the sustainability of the global system, by placing their geopolitical rivalries in the background. The role of the United Nations should not be limited to drafting a legal framework but should instead establish a structure that defines the Strait of Hormuz as an indispensable “security zone” for the global system. The main objective of this framework should not be to restrict transit, but to implement crisis-management and balancing mechanisms that ensure the sustainability of free passage.
Otherwise, the “selective passage” practices emerging in Hormuz today may set a precedent for other critical maritime chokepoints such as Bab El-Mandeb and Malacca. This could lead to the fragmentation of the global trade system and undermine the seas as a safe common domain. As a result, the ability of the seas to remain the main artery of free trade depends on the transformation of transit regimes into multilateral, institutionalized, and binding structures inspired by the spirit of Montreux and free from unilateral uses of force. If such a transformation is not achieved, the seas will become a field of fragmentation rather than global integration.